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1970]
ARTICLE

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
6-JOINDER

OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 602: Court reestablishesprerequisites to consolidation.
Much has been said about the broad discretion of the courts to
order the consolidation of actions involving a common question of law
or fact.46 Indeed, consolidation is not prevented by the fact that one
action is at law and the other in equity;47 or by the fact that the
parties in the two actions are not identical; 48 or by the fact that all
of the issues raised are not common. 49 Consolidation "is not only a
saving in time, trouble, and expense to the parties and the state, but
a preventive of the injustice which may result from divergent decisions
in each separate case." 50
Despite the ostensible ease with which actions may be joined,
counsel should not be lulled into a false sense of security. As recently
ruled by the Second Department in Rubin v. Grossmanr1 consolidation is not automatic; certain prerequisites must be met. In Rubin an
order granting a motion to consolidate a personal injury action and a
wrongful death action was reversed on the ground that plaintiff failed
to produce "medical proof showing the causal relationship between the
accident and the subsequent death .... -52
At first glance, the actions in Rubin would seem to invoke similar
questions of law and fact, particularly defendant's liability for the inifiction of the initial injury. Nonetheless, courts have stated in the
past,53 and now again in Rubin, that some medical proof is required
to show the causal connection between the injury and the death; conjecture on the part of the movant is insufficient. Obviously, the medical
affidavits need not be so extensive as to prove the causation, but they
must, at least, connect the death to the injury.
ARTICLE 21 - PAPERS
CPLR 2103(a): Licensing statute upheld by lower court.
In an apparent attempt to control the "systematic and widespread
abuses so prevalent in the field of process serving," the New York
46 CPLR 602.
47 See Philip Shlansky & Brother, Inc. v. Grossman, 273 App. Div. 544, 78 N.YS.2d 127
(1st Dep't 1948).
48 See Edelstein v. Hacker, 152 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1956).
49 See Moore v. Parks, 29 App. Div. 2d 912, 289 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1968).
50 Philip Shlansky & Brother, Inc. v. Grossman, 273 App. Div. 544, 566, 78 N.Y.S.2d
127, 128 (1st Dep't 1948).
5134 App. Div. 2d 680, 310 N.Y.S.2d 395 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem).
52 1d., 310 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
53 See Augenbraun v. G&B Distrib., 17 App. Div. 2d 785, 232 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't
1962); cf. McCarthy v. Downes, 17 App. Div. 2d 919, 233 N.YS.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1962).
54 ABC Process Serving Bureau Inc. v. City of New York, 63 Misc. 2d 33, 34, 310 N.YS.
2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, at 60, col. 1.

